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Clem Lack was one of Queensland's outstanding journalists 
and writers. His name is best known to me for his authorship of 
the authorative publication "Three Decades of Queensland 
PoHtical History", the definitive work on the 1929-1959 period 
of Queensland politics. From 1928 to 1944 Mr. Lack was a politi-
cal columnist writing first for the Courier and the Courier-Mail 
and later for the Telegraph. Subsequently he was editorial writer 
for the Age, Melbourne, and later joined the Queensland Govern-
ment as State Public Relations Officer. It is very appropriate that 
his name should be remembered through this annual oration. 
It is a paradox that the mining industry, so colourful and rich 
in history, has been one of the neglectecl areas of study by our 
historians. So much of Australia's prosperity, and indeed 
Queensland's prosperity over the past 100 years can be 
attributed to the mining industry. Writers such as Geoffrey 
Blainey and Geoffrey Bolton have captured some of the history of 
mining in Queensland, but there is still a wealth of material 
untapped. Moreover, too often, have historians concentrated on 
the romance of the nineteenth century gold rushes to the exclu-
sion of other aspects of mining. 
Yet, although gold has played a more spectacular part in our 
history, copper, the red metal, has been a more consistent and 
even an older part of mining in Queensland. 1 have called my 
address this evening "A Journey through Queensland's North-
ern Triangle" because both the copper and gold mining develop-
ments in the early years of our State formed a rough geographi-
cal triangle from Mount Morgan and Peak Downs in the south, 
to Charters Towers, the Atherton Tableland and the Cape in the 
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north, and to Cloncurry in the west. It was a triangle of waxing 
and waning fortunes, of influxes of people, European and Orien-
tal, people who often came to mine and stayed to become part of 
the North Queensland community in towns and cities and on 
farms and properties. 
At the turn of the century, mining in Queensland was in full 
swing. The large gold yields of Charters Towers, Gympie, Mount 
Morgan, Ravenswood and Croydon were understandably the 
focus of attention. However, the base metals, particularly copper, 
were prominent. Copper mines dotted the State: Mount Perry, 
Mount Chalmers, Many Peaks and Glassford Creek in Central 
Queensland, and Einasleigh, O.K., Mount Garnet and Mount 
Molloy in North Queensland were at one time centres of 
vigorous activity. But their heydays have been obscured by the 
passing of time. On the other hand, four substantial copper fields 
have engraved a niche in the State's mining history, even though 
to date the mining companies which operated them, and the 
miners who worked the lodes, have been afforded only limited 
treatment by historians. These were the Peak Downs, Chillagoe, 
Mount Morgan and Cloncurry fields, each of which experienced 
vicissitudes of varying degree. 
Tonight, I thought I would try to contribute in a small but use-
ful way to the State's historical record by looking at these four 
copper mining fields, forerunners of today's Queensland copper 
industry which is based on Mount Isa. I am indebted to Dr. K. 
Kennedy of James Cook University of North Queensland, in 
Townsville, for his invaluable assistance in researching this 
paper. 
COPPER AT PEAK DOWNS 
Queensland's flrst copper mine was at Peak Downs, near Cler-
mont. Discovered in 1861, the rich lode which assayed 17 to 54 
per cent, copper was acquired by John Manton. Unable to 
finance its development from his own pocket, Manton even-
tually persuaded two Sydney entrepreneurs, Thomas Sutcliffe 
Mort and Thomas Ware Smart, to join him in floaflng the Peak 
Downs Copper Mining Company. Incorporated on 13 November 
1862 with a capital of £100,000, the company issued only one-
third of its shares, the balance being reserved by the vendors in 
the proportion of half to Manton, and one-quarter each to Mort 
and Smart for putting up most of the working capital. Mort's 
biographer, Alan Barnard, commented on the flotation in the 
following terms: 
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Indeed, the concern seemed admirably tailored to suit 
Mort's requirements. It presented a challenge; it fulfilled 
the requirements of possessing profitable prospects and of 
developing colonial resources; it was to be directed initially 
by Mort and Smart only; it would pay dividends first on the 
cash he and Smart laid out; and, when successful, it would 
permit them to reap a speculative profit from the sale of 
their vendors' shares.' 
The mine's isolation created several problems for Manton, the 
general manager of this venture. The port of Rockhampton was 
nearly 500 kilometres away; the primitive roads were rough and 
treacherous, often subject to flooding; and teamsters were only 
willing to contract their services at excessively high rates. These 
obstacles were overcome by investing in their own teams and by 
diverting exports of ore to St. Lawrence on Broadsound, thus 
reducing the distance from mine to port by some 250 kilometres. 
By 1864 new problems had arisen. First, many workers left for 
the gold rush at Clermont and their places were filled by less 
reliable men of whom Mort wrote: "Great have been our dis-
asters owing to the drunkenness of our employees . . . sober men 
of ability are not to be met with all at once".- Second, there was 
talk of mismanagement and over-estimation of ore reserves, 
resulting in the dismissal of Manton, the original owner, from 
the position of general manager. Third, the smelters imported 
from England were proving troublesome and necessitated the 
export of blister copper to Swansea where brokers were demand-
ing exhorbitant rates. Both shipping costs and brokerage subs-
tantially reduced the returns from treatment of Peak Downs cop-
per. 
However, by 1866 the company's position seemed to have 
improved. New equipment was installed; experienced Cornish 
smelterers were engaged; and additional working capital was 
raised by an overdraft from the Bank of New South Wales. 
Further, there was a new atmosphere of public confidence in 
Peak Downs after the vendors' shares were released, and the 
market steadied at over 25 shillings a share. Manton, Smart and 
Mort gradually disposed of their interests, so that by 1870 con-
trol of the Peak Downs Copper Mining Company had long since 
passed from the influence of its promoters. 
Towards the end of 1871 copper prices boomed. Though 
shortlived, the market was never to attain the same heights until 
World War 1, a period of over 40 years. For a brief period, Peak 
Downs commanded the attention not only of Sydney and 
Melbourne investors but also of London men. Shares were sell-
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ing at nearly £ 9 each, and dividends were declared with exciflng 
frequency, culminating in a half-yearly declaration of £100,000 
in late 1872 which brought the aggregate dividends from the 
mine to £215,250. But the shareholders' exhilaration soon turned 
sour, and management was left red-faced. Copper prices plum-
meted between the declaration of the £100,000 diviciend and the 
actual sale of the copper stocks on which it had been declared, so 
the company had paid out money it had not received. The com-
pany, now plunged into financial crisis, never recovered from 
the set-back, which was reflected in the slump in share prices to 
less than five shiUings a share by the end of 1873.^ 
The Peak Downs Copper Mining Company was liquidated in 
1877, ostensibly to discharge its bank overdraft. A further 
£63,000 was realised, although the mine itself was sold for only 
£3,000. But as a government geologist later commented on the 
decision to abandon operation: 
There is more than a suspicion, however, that the reduced 
grade of ore in the deeper levels was at least a contributing 
factor.•* 
I am not sure if that kind of report would meet the present day 
requirements of the Stock Exchange. 
In its 15 years of activity the company mined 100,000 tons of 
oxidized carbonates averaging about 17 per cent, copper. It pro-
vided jobs for several hundred workers, including nearly 200 
Cornish miners. In fact, at the height of its prosperity nearly 
2000 people lived on the field. But like so many other mines in 
Australia it was plagued by extravagant management and divi-
dend-hungry shareholders who knew little of the needs to 
prospect and develop ore reserves. As the eminent historian, 
Geoffrey Blainey lamented: 
The mine was rich enough to triumph over isolation and 
heat and high wages, but not the optimism of its owners.^ 
THE CHILLAGOE REGION 
Queensland's copper output remained very low for the next 
two decades, paled into insignificance by the gold yields of Gym-
pie, Charters Towers, the Palmer, Croydon and the "Mountain 
of Gold" — Mount Morgan. However, developments on the 
remote slopes of Tasmania's western coast ushered in a revival in 
copper mining. Melbourne men who had been associated first 
with the Broken Hill silver boom of the 1880's and then with 
Tasmania's Mount Lyell turned their attention to Queensland, in 
particular to the Chillagoe region of the far North where the wily 
Scot, John Moffat, was working copper deposits on a small scale. 
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J. S. Reid and C. W. Chapman joined Moffat in floating a com-
pany to acquire his Chillagoe leases. They then approached the 
Queensland Government to build a private railway from 
Mareeba to Chillagoe, smelters at Chillagoe and the wharf at 
Cairns in return for mineral lease concessions, the right to set 
their own rail tariffs, and exemptions from labour conditions on 
their mining properties. It was an ambitious project, but one 
which the Government welcomed in the wake of the collapse of 
the Queensland National Bank, and duly approved by special 
Act of Parliament. 
Chillagoe Railway and Mines Limited was registered in 
Melbourne on 16 June 1898. Its authorised share capital was 
£1,800,000 made up of 900,000 shares of S2 each of which the 
promoters held the lion's share, fully paid up, for their part in 
floating the company. Successful debenture issues totalling 
£450,000 secured sufficient capital to meet the cost of the rail-
way, the smelters and other fixed assets; but it was clear from the 
outset that there was insufficient working capital for such a 
large-scale venture. Not that this fact deterred investors. On the 
contrary, Chillagoe shares were exchanged for more than double 
their par value in 1899 even before the railway had been com-
pleted or the smelters erected or the mines developed. 
This speculative activity was induced by three factors. First, 
copper increased in price from £48 a ton in 1898 to £78 a ton in 
1899. As Geoffrey Bolton comments: "Overseas the nineties were 
going out in wars and rumours of wars, and these meant good 
times for the metal market"." Second, the promoters and direc-
tors of the Chillagoe company had a reputation for success. Men 
of stature in the mining business such as Harvey Patterson, 
William Knox, Valentine Saddler, H. F. C. Keats, Sir Malcolm 
McEachern, and Alexander Stewart (late of the Tharsis mine in 
Spain, and then Broken Hill) were associated with Chillagoe. 
And most prominent was J. S. Reid, Australia's leading railwav 
promoter. Reid had promoted the Silverton Tramwav Company 
which operated from Broken Hill to the South Australian border 
and had paid £4 dividend on every £1 share in its first nine years; 
he was connected with the formidable pair, William Jamieson 
and Bowes Kelly, in the Emu Bay Railway Company on the west 
coast of Tasmania: he was one-time director of B.H.P., a substan-
tial shareholder in Mount Lyell companies, and promoter of the 
Sulphide Corporation. Blainey has called these men "The Mag-
nates" and claims that they "made some of the most courageous 
and sensible decisions in the history of Australian business". He 
writes: 
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Usually they received promoters' shares at bargain prices 
and the money they contributed was less important than 
the name which they lent; they were the bell-wethers 
whose fame enticed timid sheep to enter the share lists. 
He continues: 
. . . it seems their main financial contribution was not large 
sums of capital but small sums which they invested in the 
first years when the risk of failure was high. They were 
entrepreneurs rather than capitalists.'' 
Third, there were the reports of geologists and respected 
authorities on the prospects of the region. From the official 
geological reports of R. L. Jack and B. J. Skertchly, copper ores 
were abundant; the Mining Warden described the region as 
"undoubtedly the home of copper, and . . . promises to be one of 
the world's principal copper producers";" even the reliable, 
sometimes pessimistic Australian Mining Standard published an 
opinion that Chillagoe was "destined to be one of the largest 
contributions to the copper output of the world"." Alexander 
Stewart, the company's general manager, officially claimed that 
Chillagoe Railway and Mines Limited had over half a million 
tons of medium to high-grade ore in reserves. To put this figure 
in perspective, it is less than a month's production at Mount Isa 
today. Notwithstanding, there was a hint of shadiness about the 
whole enterprise — what Bolton has described as "over-smart 
speculation and queer business deals".'" 
The Chillagoe bubble burst just as the railway was completed 
and the smelters were blown in. Several factors combined to 
plunge the company into crisis. First, a Royal Commissioner's re-
port on a falsified prospectus of a company holding leases adja-
cent to the Chillagoe company's properties tainted the reputation 
of the region." Second, the release of a report on the company's 
ore reserves, showing that the metallic content was less than 
one-third the original estimate provided by the company's 
general manager commenced a run of Chillagoe shares. A 
further report confirmed that the ore reserves had been over-
rated, and criticised management and development policy at the 
mines. Third, by segregating one group of mines at Mungana 
and floating a subsidiary company to manage them, and by 
undertaking further railway construction towards Mount 
Garnet, the directors of the company over-extended its financial 
resources. When it became known that the directors were 
un load ing their shares , yet s imul taneous ly advising 
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shareholders to retain faith, it proved too much.'- Late in 1901, 
all work was suspended pending a reconstruction of the com-
pany. 
Operations were recommenced in March 1902. However, lack 
of suitable ores and high fuel costs impinged on smelting 
activities. In 1904 the company was unable to meet its debenture 
commitments and was again reconstructed the following year. 
J. S. Reid, now chairman of the company, sought the assistance of 
the State Government to extend the railway to Etheridge 
goldfield by the way of the Einasleigh copper mine. To avert the 
"practical abandonment of ChiUagoe"'' the Government re-
sponded favourably, although the line was not officially opened 
until February 1911, by which time the company had been 
plagued by further difficulties. After 1908, strikes, falling metal 
prices, the closure of two major mines because of creeps and fire, 
the exhaustion of the rich surface lodes and other factors com-
pounded to force a final reconstruction of the company in 1913, 
by which time it was too late. Even the prospect of cheaper fuel 
from Mount Mulligan could not reverse the losses on mining 
and smelting operations. In March 1914, the company sus-
pended operations for the last time. 
SEVERE BLOW TO NORTH 
The agony of Chillagoe can be attributed to over-capitalisa-
tion, extravagance on railway construction, failure to assure 
sufficient ore supplies, and ineptitude in management techni-
ques and company policy. Bolton is strongly critical of manage-
ment: 
Firms such as the Chillagoe company were mainly after 
quick dividends. Their failure could not be attributed to 
inexperience, for most of the directors were men well 
known on the Broken Hill and Mount Lyell fields. But they 
spent too much attention in playing the stock market, and 
not enough on prospecting their ore bodies before their 
capital was spent; there was too little contact between the 
governing body in Melbourne and the managers and 
engineers on the spot ...'•> 
The closure of the Chillagoe smelters was a severe blow to the 
northern mining industry: many miners and smelterers collect-
ed their possessions and set out for the coastal sugar-grow-
ing areas, and others turned to the Cloncurry region for work. 
However, in 1915 there was renewed hope for a revival with 
the election of the Ryan Labor Government: one of its major 
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promises was to create a State mining and smelting enterprise in 
the north. By acquiring the assets of the Chillagoe company, the 
Government could not only redeem its election pledge but also 
redress the mining depression in the region. After three years of 
negotiations with the trustees for the debenture holders, of 
wrangles with a hostile Legislative Council, of investigations by 
two select committees of inquiry, the State take-over was 
accomplished in November 1918. The purchase price for the rail-
ways, smelters, plant, and mines was over £700,000. 
The Chillagoe enterprise was operated by the State until 1927 
when, ironically, a Labor Premier ordered its closure. Over eight 
years, due partly to depressed world prices and partly to gross 
mismanagement, the Chillagoe experiment cost the State no less 
than £1,200,000 in accumulated losses. 
The Chillagoe smelters were re-opened in 1929 and operated 
with limited capacity until 1943, relying heavily on ores from 
Cloncurry. Finally they were sold and dismantled in 1950. Pro-
duction figures for the district are incomplete. Under State con-
trol the maximum output was around 4000 tons a year. During 
its reign, the Chillagoe company treated nearly 500,000 tons of 
ore for 23,272 tons of copper, 31,758 tons of lead, 4.3 million 
ounces of silver, and nearly 30,000 ounces of gold. These figures 
represent a very hollow return from an area described as late as 
1907 as "one of the richest mining districts of the world".'"^ 
GOLD AND COPPER 
Let us turn now to Mount Morgan. It was long considered 
Australia's premier gold mine, but from the immediate pre-
World War I years, copper output surpassed the value of gold 
raised. Acquired by the Morgan brothers of Rockhampton as 640 
acres of freehold property for the grand sum of £640, this 
"mountain of ironstone", as it was described, was to yield stun-
ning dividends over the succeeding four decades. The initial 
flnance was provided by a Rockhampton bank manager, T. S. 
Hall — £1200 in all. Once a battery was erected the mine was 
able to finance its own further development, even though a deal 
of the flne gold was being lost in treatment. For their part, the 
Morgan brothers were not enthusiastic about the mine's 
prospects' their test shaft had missed the lode, and they happily 
sold their interests for the princely sum of £88,000. The bulk of 
their interest was acquired by a local solicitor, William Knox 
D'Arcy. I" 
Mount Morgan Gold Mining Company Limited was registered 
in Queensland on 1 October 1886. Despite the share market's 
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optimism, there were problems at the mine. Treatment 
difficulties persisted; much of the iron ore had already been 
extracted; and no provision had been made for a capital reserve 
fund. Though the quantity of ore mined increased through the 
1890's, the declining grade of ore indicated that the mine was 
failing. In August 1901, Mount Morgan declared its lowest divi-
dend to date of only threepence per share; in September, no divi-
dend was paid at all. It was a depressing outlook for a company 
whose market valuation in 1900 had ranked it the largest com-
pany in Australia. 
For too long the directors had been preoccupied with gold. 
Mount Morgan was a pyritic deposit — like Mount Lyell — rich 
in copper sulphide at depth. With borrowed capital, manage-
ment turned to copper production to complement the gold out-
put. 
Between 1902 and 1906 less than 1000 tons of copper were 
recovered, but from late 1906 when new smelters were blown in. 
Mount Morgan rapidly expanded its copper production. In fact 
some 43,000 tons had been marketed by the outbreak of war, 
over 9000 tons of which were produced in 1913 and shipped to 
Germany.'^ Like most Australian copper producers. Mount 
Morgan experienced shipping problems, market dislocations and 
labour shortages in 1914-15. While many difficulties had to be 
overcome during the war years, at least the market was stabilised 
by the Imperial Government's requisition of Australian copper; 
and the escalation in price to £150 a ton in 1916 provided a com-
forting fillip for mine managers, directors and shareholders. 
Authorities were confident that copper prices would be sus-
tained at around £100 a ton after the war due to reconstruction 
demands. Not so. By 1920 copper prices fell to £70 a ton and con-
tinued to slide. Most copper mines in Australia had little choice 
but to close down. At Mount Morgan, wages were reduced and 
workers walked out in protest. Blainey has summed up the 
ramifications of the post-war mining collapse for Mount 
Morgan: 
No slag was poured while the company and government 
and men argued on who should make those sacrifices with-
out which the mine was doomed. After a year the works re-
opened and earned no profits. The company blamed the 
men and they blamed the company. The mine caught fire in 
1925 and they argued while Mount Morgan burned.''* 
Few would dare to prophesy a future for Mount Morgan after 
the liquidators were called in two years later. It seemed that the 
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mine which had produced over £ 20-million in gold, £ 11 -million 
in copper and over £10-million in dividends for shareholders 
would pass into history. One man, however, retained faith in the 
"mountain of ironstone". Adam Boyd, a native of Scotland, was 
general manager when the old company folded. He floated 
Mount Morgan Limited with a modest capital of only £95,000 in 
1929 to re-open the mine by open-cut, and survived the depres-
sion with a Government loan and by concentrating on gold pro-
duction. The loan was repaid by 1934 and new smelters were 
erected in 1936 to treat copper, by now greatly improved in 
price.-" 
Mount Morgan remained Queensland's major copper pro-
ducer until the early 1950's, averaging between 4000 and 5000 
tons a year. In 1967 the mine was acquired by Peko-Wallsend. 
Despite a yield of 7646 tons of copper in 1976, an announcement 
was made that the mine would close. This was later retracted 
after the work force was reduced, and operations are continuing. 
Mount Morgan has been both colourful and important in 
Queensland's history. Its most celebrated mine manager was 
probably Captain George Richard. He insisted on being called 
Captain, not because of any Cornish mining association but 
because he had commanded Mount Morgan's company of militia 
whom he led against striking shearers in the tense days of the 
early 1890's. Captain Richard was more than just colourful. He 
was a metallurgical engineer who is remembered today for his 
innovative use of chlorine in extracting gold from low-grade ore. 
Today it is easy to overlook the importance of the Mount Morgan 
mine in its long history. It was the wealth from Mount Morgan 
in the early 1900's that sustained the early search and develop-
ment of oil in the Middle East. Nor was Mount Morgan alone in 
being an important mine 80 years ago. Today the mining indus-
try is proud of earning nearly 40 per cent, of Australia's export 
income. At the turn of the century, more than 40 per cent, of 
Australia's export income came from metals, and Queensland 
mines contributed a major part of this. 
THE CLONCURRY FIELD 
Seven hundred kilometres to the north-west of Mount Morgan 
is the Cloncurry mineral field, one time the largest copper pro-
ducer in Australia when its mines and smelters sustained over 
7000 people. The lodes of the Cloncurry district were located as 
early as 1867 by Ernest Henry, who for a short time worked the 
Great Australian mine until high transport costs forced its 
closure. Henry sold his mine in 1884 to a Glasgow syndicate 
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which in turn erected smelters and recruited nearly two hundred 
miners and smelterers. But like Henry, the Glasgow syndicate 
found that the mine's remoteness was too great an obstacle.-' It 
was clear that the pre-requisite to development of the north-
west's copper areas was cheap and reliable communications, 
preferably a rail link with a port on the Gulf of Carpentaria. 
Between 1883 and 1908, Cloncurry agitated for a railway, only 
to be disappointed on many occasions. 
Finally in 1905, the State commenced a railway extension from 
Richmond to Cloncurry. The port of Townsville, 400 kilometres 
more distant than Normanton, thus became the outlet for the 
north-west. In retrospect, criticisms of this decision are fully 
justified, as Blainey pointed out nearly 20 years ago: 
Possibly the Government hoped to build a railway to the 
Gulf when the copjierfield had proved its wealth. But that 
railway remains no more than a hope, and for 50 years an 
alarming share of the wealth of Cloncurry and Mount Isa 
has been wasted on the long railway to Townsville and the 
east.--
Even before the railway materialized, many of the most pro-
mising areas in the Cloncurry region were taken up by the 
Melbourne magnates. William Orr, Herman Schlapp and 
William Knox secured properties around Hampden, 40 miles 
south of Cloncurry. Almost simultaneously John Moffat stole a 
march on them by acquiring properties at Mount Elliott. 
Patiently they awaited the rail link, testing the ore bodies before 
launching their companies. When copper prices escalated in 
1906 soon after the State had commenced the railway, two major 
public companies were launched. Hampden Cloncurry Copper 
Mines Limited was registered in March 1906 with notables such 
as Patterson, Keates, Orr and W. L. Baillieu on the board. Mount 
Elliott Limited was registered in Victoria the same year with V. J. 
Saddler as chairman, but was soon after sold to British interests. 
Both companies had much of their capital underwritten in Lon-
don, and at a frenzied pace opened up their mines, erected 
smelters and connected their properties by rail link with Clon-
curry. 
In the immediate pre-war years the Cloncurry field was a hive 
of activity, and the Hampden and Mount Elhott companies were 
readily saluted in official circles for their enterprise. Between 
1910 and 1913 Mount Elliott yielded no less than £424,000 in 
dividends. 
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DANGERS IN RIVALRY 
Hampden declared its flrst dividend of £140,000 in 1913, and 
from 1915 to 1918 was to declare further successive dividends 
totalling £ 267,500. Despite the high proflts there was concern, 
particularly on the part of William Corbould, managing director 
of Mount Elliott, that the fierce rivalry would eventually damage 
the prospects of the fleld. An amalgamation proposal never got 
off the ground, and after 1913 both companies indulged in a 
struggle to absorb most of the smaller operations of the area. This 
struggle had dire consequences. By ear-marking working capital 
for acquiring new properties, the companies had insufficient 
funds for development programmes and, as the rich surface ores 
were worked out, management soon found itself confronted 
with higher realisation costs on sulphide ores. In fact, had it not 
been for the high war-time copper prices the field may have 
experienced an even shorter period of prosperity. 
From its peak production in 1918, the Cloncurry field suc-
cumbed to tumbling world markets within only two years. Local 
problems, however, contributed substantially to the collapse. 
Many of the rich ore bodies had been worked out; labour prob-
lems were proving costly; management had failed to respond to 
new technologies; overseas investments had dried up; and high 
living costs, wages, and fuel costs greatly increased overheads. 
North from Cloncurry, Mount Cuthbert and Mount Oxide had 
patiently awaited a rail link, which came too late to offset press-
ing financial problems. The final crunch came when the Com-
monwealth Bank withdrew war-time arrangements of advanc-
ing funds on copper awaiting export. 
Throughout the 1920's many mines were sublet to parties of 
"gougers", who with State assistance despatched ores to the 
Chillagoe State Smelters. Mines such as Trekelano and Mount 
Oxide were worked on a small scale, but the vain hope that the 
old companies would resume operations was never fulfilled. 
Ironically, the Cloncurry prospectus ignored the outcrops of 
Mount Isa, and it took William Corbould, the man who resigned 
from Mount Elliott in 1922, embittered and frustrated with the 
company's London board, to fully appreciate Mount Isa's poten-
tial. It was Corbould who founded Mount Isa Mines Limited in 
1924 to develop the lead ore body discovered by John Campbell 
Miles in the previous year. Corbould was its first managing 
director, who directed the search for ore reserves and capital to 
develop them, and who opened up the field by negotiating the 
vital rail link from Duchess to Mount Isa.-^ 
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The temporary decline of the Queensland copper industry 
after World War 1 coincided not only with the advent of new 
metallurgical techniques and modes of transport but also with 
the end of the era of the independent prospector. 
Camel train at the railway siding at Duchess. 
CAMELS AS TRANSPORT 
Transport certainly had been revolutionized by 1920. Before 
railways opened up many mining fields in the Queensland 
interior, the conventional mode of transport was horse or mule 
teams or pack camels. Even after the turn of the century, camels 
were used to haul copper ores in the Chillagoe and Cloncurry 
regions. One veteran camel master, Abdul Wade, made such a 
success of his strings that upon retirement he was often seen fre-
quenting London's exclusive Savoy Hotel. Camels were even-
tually replaced by traction engines, and by the 1920's traction 
engines had been superceded by motor lorries. In fact, the advent 
of the internal combustion engine and the motor vehicle marks 
one of the significant watersheds in Australian history; at first 
complementing the railways, and then, because of its flexibility, 
overtaking it as the major mode of transport.-- As for passenger 
travel, the bone-jarring experience of over-laden coaches proved 
a memorable experience. 
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W. S. Robinson, renowned financier of the Australian base 
metal industry, recalled in his memoirs his first encounter with 
the black soil plains of Queensland when travelling by coach 
from Richmond to Cloncurry: 
We had no way of flnding out how much rain, if any, had 
fallen out on the plains we had to cross to the west 
. . . There were fifteen passengers and literally tons of bag-
gage and cargo. I sat on the box seat alongside the driver 
and when we drove out of town it was clear that the over-
loaded coach would be in trouble. 
. . . (The driver) suggested to me that all ablebodied men 
should get down and walk to give the horses a chance on 
the sodden earth. All but a woman and baby got off and 
walked, and a few of the young men like myself never got 
on the coach again until we reached Coobiaby, about 
seventy-five miles out. It took three days and three nights 
to get that far, and my feet were so raw that I took my boots 
and socks off and walked in bare feet with my boots over 
my arm.2^ 
By the 1920's, many of the instant townships had been 
deserted. If there was one characteristic of mining townships in 
boom periods, it was the notion of impermanency reflected in the 
rough hessian and galvanised iron dwellings of many miners 
which inevitably encircled the more substantial structures repre-
sented by hotels and public buildings. It was only after a mining 
area proved itself that the ramshackled dwellings were replaced 
by miners' cottages. The miner himself prized his independence, 
disliked working for wages if possible, and was oblivious to the 
many hardships. Lack of sanitation, typhoid and dysentery, 
adulterated liquor, heat, flies, and monotonous diets were part 
and parcel of his way of life in the less established townships. 
Bolton writes of the Chillagoe region: 
Poor sanitation still caused outbreaks of typhoid, and the 
water supply was heavily impregnated with lime — 'but' 
shrugged one observer, 'Chillagoe-ites don't drink water as 
a rule'. The outlying centres had even less charm. O.K. had 
the name of a brawling, noisy township where even if a 
man could not 'be drunk for ever on liquor, love and 
fights', he could, if so minded, go near enough if he was 
willing to substitute two-up for love.-^ 
Similarly, W. S. Robinson recalled his reception at the Gorge 
Hotel in the Cloncurry district, when seeking a meal: 
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(I) went across to the rickety looking 'pub' where a slat-
ternly girl leant against the door, lazily brushing off her 
face some of the multitude of Australian flies. She did not 
alter her stance until I mentioned food and drink, and then 
only to indicate by a swish of her hand the 'dining room', 
which was just filthy. 'Any grub?' 1 asked, and she replied: 
'Got a scrap or two of corn', which I correctly guessed 
meant corned beef. 'No veg's?' I queried. 'No veg's', she 
repHed. 'Any pickles?' said 1, in a hopeful tone. She went 
into cracks of derisive laughter and called to her equally 
slatternly sister in the 'kitchen', a lean-to off the dining 
room: 'Gripes Liza, come here. There's a blighter thinks it's 
Christmas — he's bidding for pickles with his meat!'-' 
After the turn of the century the majority of miners had 
become reconciled to their employment by companies as wages 
men. Rates varied between seven and nine shillings a day. 
Periodically, relations between mining companies and their 
employees deteriorated, leading to disharmony. To counter wage 
cuts often necessitated by falling metal prices, employees 
resorted to collective action invariably culminating in strikes. 
Mount Morgan, Chillagoe and the Cloncurry field witnessed the 
rise of embryonic unionism prior to 1910. 
By the outbreak of World War I the Australian Workers' 
Union had captured the work force in most Queensland base 
metal regions. Disdaining "wild cat" strikes, the A.W.U. exer-
cised a relatively tight rein on its members, but by the end of the 
war a more militant spirit had infiltrated the ranks. The dogged 
struggles with management in the immediate post World War 1 
era, at a time when falling metal prices were jeopardising copper 
mining operations in Queensland and other States, was a con-
tributing factor to the demise of the Mount Morgan and Clon-
curry fields. 
MOUNT ISA'S GROWTH 
A new era in the Queensland copper industry was ushered in 
during World War II when Mount Isa converted from lead treat-
ment to copper. Between 1943 and 1946 nearly £3.5 million 
worth of copper was produced in the north-west. Although 
Mount Isa Mines Limited turned back to silver-lead treatment in 
the immediate post-war years, it did not neglect its copper 
prospects. On the contrary, in 1948, construction of a new 
smelter which took five years to complete was commenced. 
Simultaneously, large sums were invested in exploration and 




Mount Isa tent village in 1932. 
January 1953, production began in earnest. In 1954, just 25 years 
ago, Queensland's copper output exceeded the 25,000 tons mark 
for the first time in its history. Last year the Mount Isa produc-
tion was six-fold that figure. Indeed, for nearly a decade after 
copper production was resumed. Mount Isa Mines accounted for 
over 50 per cent, of the State's value of output of all minerals, 
thus confirming Mount Isa as one of the world's great base metal 
producers. 
Today, Mount Isa is the world's largest mine producer of both 
lead and silver and among the top ten producers of copper and 
zinc. Copper mining is part of Queensland's past, our present 
and our future. Early copper mining brought people to remote 
parts of the State as the large-scale mining operations have done 
in more recent times, encouraging State development, 
decentralisation and community development. 
Today the Northern Triangle is contributing to the nation to 
an even greater extent than before. Peak Downs is now in the 
heart of one of the world's major coking coal regions. In the 
north lies a variety of mining-based activities, bauxite at Weipa, 
nickel at Greenvale and tin in the Tablelands. In the west is the 
great Mount Isa, together with the Mary Kathleen uranium 
mine. The historic triangle of past glories is also a triangle for the 
future of Queensland. 
m 
Converters at Kuridala. Much of the old smelting plant at Kuridala and Sel-
wyn was cannibilised during the Second World War for use in copper produc-
tion at Mount Isa. 
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